New Japanese civil society : Kobe earthquake of 1995 and Fukushima accident of 2011 as focal points in the development of the Japanese civil society after WW II by Guzik, Joanna
R O C Z N I K  O R I E N T A L I S T Y C Z N Y, T. LXX, Z. 2, 2017, (s. 145–160)
JOANNA M. GUZIK
New Japanese Civil Society: 
Kobe Earthquake of 1995 and Fukushima Accident of 2011 as Focal 
Points in the Development of the Japanese Civil Society After WW II
Abstract
On March 11 2011 an earthquake in Japan generated huge tremors and a series of tsunamis 
causing unprecedented nuclear crisis in this country. The death toll (with missing people) 
reached almost 20,000 and 340,000 people had to evacuate. The Fukushima accident 
showed to the Japanese people that the government was not prepared properly enough 
for such a crisis as it should have been especially having had learnt the lessons from 
Kobe earthquake of 1995. Since 2011 there have been in Japan growing manifestations 
of people’s opinions on the matter and who even wish for the better future for their 
offspring with no atom. The Japanese society has been changing into a new civil society 
and is less alike to that one presented by the first Orientalists and the subsequent ones 
who disseminated knowledge based rather on stereotypes. The article aims to show 
the phenomenon of Japanese civil society with the new tendencies in voluntarism and 
demonstrations after 1995 along with the reasons for them and reactions of the state to 
the crises arose in 1995 and 2011. The work argues (state for the end of March 2017) 
that there is a new quality in the movement and also proves that even though Japan has 
been the only country in the world that has suffered hugely from the atom not once, the 
civil society was not strong enough to control the nuclear industry and the government 
and what is more, the ballots in 2012 and 2016 were surprisingly filled in with names 
of politicians who represent parties supporting development of nuclear energy stance. 
Keywords: Shimin shakai, Japanese voluntarism and activism, new civil society, volunteer 
revolution, denuclearization, demonstrations, NPOs, NGOs, Kobe earthquake 1995, Sendai 
earthquake 2011, Fukushima accident, March 11, ‘nuclear village’, Japanese elections of 
2012 and 2016 
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Japanese civil society
The question of civil society is becoming more and more important in Japan too. In 
spite of the strong tradition of social consensus, the country, in reaction to the growing 
distrust of the ruling circles, seems to be moving toward a new form of government 
where the voice of the people is growing stronger. 
First of all, the definition of the term ‘civil society’ in general should be referred to. 
Worth emphasizing is the fact that the concept is not new, but its meaning in the ancient 
Rome and Greece was different: equating to the state. The modern notion of the phrase 
was developed in the second half of the 18th century during the Enlightenment and after 
some decades of oblivion it gained back its popularity after WWII to become even of 
mantric nature after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.1 Civil society encompasses the 
domain of social activities which are of sustainable nature and organized in groups of 
non-state, non-family or non-market origins.2 NGOs, NPOs, as well as unions and other 
organizations or even individuals with contradictory views can contribute to the civil 
society, however, even being robust they cannot ensure democracy. As Carothers citing 
Sheri Berman proves that in Germany of the 1920s and the 1930s lively civil society 
was only a stage for the Nazi Party which absorbed them in the end.3 Supposedly vivid 
civil society is a highly needed stage in the societal development even though it does 
not guarantee any rights, nevertheless it is highly recommended to have it. 
The term ‘civil society’ in Japan must be analyzed from the specific cultural approach 
as the literal translation of it – shimin shakai is contemporarily considered by the Japanese 
scientists to have rather leftist, i.e. communist association and it was in use after 1945.4 It 
was not present in the academic and activist discussion of the subject in the 19th century 
probably due to absorption of the western ideas in Japan from the countries that showed 
the worldwide trend of strengthening the state at the expense of civil society.5 Since the 
1990s the Japanized version of the very same English term shibiru sosaeti along with 
borantia (‘volounteer’) have spread widely in the discourse to distinguish the new wave 
and to emphasize new quality in civil society movement from the previous one.6 
The first signs of civil society in Japan can be traced back to even Edo (Tokugawa) 
era 1603 (1600) –1868, when despite strict rules set for the society, in the middle of the 
period, some groups of people found their way for promoting reforms, like merchants’ 
academy in Osaka. Among those who were discussing the future of the society were also 
young samurai with knowledge disseminated in their domains. They met and debated on 
the issues important for them at that time.7
1 Carothers, Barndt 1999–2000: 18–19. 
2 Anheier 2004: X.
3 Carothers, Barndt 1999–2000: 22–23.
4 Bochorodycz 2008: 18.
5 Ibidem.
6 Ibidem; Sugimoto 2014: 306.
7 Garon 2003: 45.
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The Constitution, promulgated in 1946 and introduced six months later in 1947 is the 
base for the civil society in Japan. Being a document (controversial at those times for 
the Japanese people and for some of them until now) created by foreigners occupying the 
Archipelago as allied forces represented by mainly American troops, it gave to the Japanese 
people the rights they did not have for many years due to harsh times of changes on the 
political scene and war of 1931–1945. This document was not even accepted at once by 
the Japanese parliament as some laws were too progressive. The Constitution of Japan 
grants to its citizens freedom of speech, gatherings, belief, the same rights to both men 
and women. It also guarantees among the others a just judiciary system.8 Article 11 says: 
The people shall not be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental 
human rights. These fundamental human rights guaranteed to the people 
by this Constitution shall be conferred upon the people of this and future 
generations as eternal and inviolate rights.9 
The next article, the Article 12 of the Constitution is the guarantor of the aforementioned 
rights and also puts some limits on individuals when exercising their freedom: 
The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution 
shall be maintained by the constant endeavour of the people, who shall 
refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and rights and shall always be 
responsible for utilizing them for the public welfare.10 
The Japanese have a modern constitution which should imply their independence and 
autonomy within the state as individuals. The phenomenon of the civil society ought to 
find nutritious soil in Japan. Article 21 even assures civil society activities:
Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press and all 
other forms of expression are guaranteed (…).11 
On the contrary to the freedom granted in the constitution, civil law (code) is not 
always so lenient and due from the perspective of some citizens of Japan and it comes 
from 1896.12 Even though it is not the newest document it is still valid in contemporary 
Japan and also influences regulations concerning the civil society, which will be analyzed 
later in the article.
Despite some popular opinions about the Japanese people spread in the 70. and 80., 
who are perceived as those who are alike, polite and thus always follow the rules and 
 8 Kantei 1947.
 9 Ibidem.
10 Ibidem.
11 Ibidem.
12 MOJ, 1896.
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the law and do not rebel nor demonstrate their own opinions, the Japanese have had 
a quite long history of showing their strong discontent over, for example, political issues, 
international relations, or over such prosaic matters like rising prices of train tickets. 
The demonstrations that took place only in Tokyo in years 1905–1918 often changed 
into violent riots as many as nine times in the span of only these years.13 Despite the 
fact that the society at the end of Meiji period (1868–1912) and in the first years of 
Taishō period (1912–1926) differs from the contemporary one, still it is undeniable that 
the will of people of those times expressed on the streets was an important matter. The 
Public Order Preservation Act from 1925 forced the Japanese society to change its 
behavioural patterns and strengthened the Special Higher Police. The act was abrogated 
only in 1945.14 In the period of the American occupation of this country (1945–1952) the 
society after the years of war and indoctrination was in trauma which was increased by 
the suffering and pain caused by loss of many lives during the conflict and attained its 
apogee after the nuclear bomb attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6th and 9th August 
1945. With San Francisco Peace Treaty from 1951, coming into the effect in 1952, Japan 
regained its sovereignty to some extent depending on the interpretation of the Security 
Treaty Between the United States and Japan.15 The spark for the demonstrations and also 
activities of civil society in Japan was given by the negotiations on prolongation of the 
very treaty in 1959, when the people rioted.16 What is more, the Japan’s Prime Minister 
Kishi’s felonious past as well as his behaviour in the parliament also contributed to the 
apprehension of return of militarism of war times. Nobusuke Kishi was co-responsible 
for signing the attack on Pearl Harbour, worked as a high-rank bureaucrat, vice-minister 
on some cabinets and he was released from the prison in 1948 during the amnesty of 
December.17 Shinzō Abe, Prime Minister in office, is his grandson.18 People went to the 
streets to manifest their outrage and their activity involved many. Kishi resigned and 
his successor promised that Japan would double its income in 10 years. These words 
prompted people to return to their daily activities. The next reason for the Japanese people 
to demonstrate long and persistently was the renewal of the Security Treaty with U.S. 
in 1970 and American involvement in the Vietnam War.19 Since 1945 Japan has had on 
its soil American troops which are to protect Japan and for them Japanese Archipelago 
is like a base to start any new mission fast and at ease.
13 Gordon 2010: 187.
14 Tsuzuki 2000: 258.
15 Avalon 1951.
16 Gatu 2015: 181.
17 Gatu 2015: 172.
18 Oros: 2017: 105.
19 Gatu 2015: 181.
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Table 1. Biggest rallies and demonstrations against security treaties with US and the 
Vietnam War
Reason Years Duration (in months)
Participants 
in rallies and 
demonstrations 
(in mln)
Arrested 
Wounded 
police 
officers
Japan-US Security Treaty 
1960 1959–1960 19 4.6 886 2,236
1.  Japan-US Security Treaty 
1970 
2.  Vietnam War and rooted 
in Japan American forces
1970–1973 33 18.7 26,373 14,684
Source: Gatu 2015: 181.
Other movements in these times supported peace for Vietnam (Beheiren, 1965–1974), 
others tried to fight the pollution effects, having the media on their side.20 These 
demonstrations were supported by organizations sometimes rooted in the government and 
therefore it is questionable if they are pure example of civil society’s activities. The year 
of 1989 and its aftermath changed the world and also influenced the Japanese society. 
As Hasegawa explains, the new civil society was attempting to ‘counter the country’s 
conservative, authoritarian, and paternalistic politics’.21 
The case of Kobe 1995 and its aftermath
The next step taken by Japan in its development of civil society was the new law 
introduced in 1998 due to the actions undertaken by the Japanese in 1995 after the Kobe 
earthquake (Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 17 January 1995). The death toll number 
reached about 6,430 people and evacuees number reached 310,000.22 The effects of the 
tremors found this port city unprepared the way it should have been. So the government 
was criticised for the lacking in crisis-management system what was by far visible and 
caused among the Japanese astonishment. The roads leading to Kobe were destroyed 
and subsequently the help was hindered. There was not enough doctors and also the 
decision about use of SDF (Self-Defense Forces) to help out in Kobe took too much time.23 
Red tape stopped doctors from abroad from coming to Kobe as they did not have licences 
to practice in Japan. The rescue dogs had to undergo a special procedure of quarantine 
20 Gatu 2015: 180, 182.
21 Hasegawa 2014: 285.
22 Schwartz 2003: 14.
23 Johnston 2011.
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on the airport slowing the rescue efforts down.24 Despite all the mentioned setbacks, 
the Japanese civilians rushed with help to this destroyed and cut off city in number of 
1,377,300 volunteers within a year.25 The phenomenon was named ‘volunteer revolution’.26 
It is worth mentioning that the word ‘volunteer’ in Japanese may have sometimes slightly 
different meaning from European languages, as borantia could be understood also as 
a person who receives remuneration for their voluntary work.27 By the year of 1995 the 
concept of ‘disaster-relief volunteers’ had not been widely known in Japan.28 Until that 
time for the Japanese people volunteering was understood as donating money. Another 
meaning of the word was rather constrained to specific areas of activities, such as helping 
to the disabled people,29 elderly people care and relief operations undertaken abroad.30 
For the purpose of the present paper it would be proper to analyze the meanings 
of terms such as nonprofits organisations (NPOs) and nongovernmental organisations 
(NGOs). As Pekkanen says, “[c]onventionally in Japan, domestically active groups are 
called ‘NPOs’, while ‘NGOs’ is usually used to refer to groups involved in international 
activities”.31 NGOs can operate both in Japan and simultaneously in a foreign country.32 
Pekkanen continues also that Japanese NPO term is rather more frequently used when 
evoking to all organizations of nonprofit character.33 
To Kobe in 1995 rushed many people who tried to offer their help. Interestingly, 
among the first who came to help were yakuza (Japanese mafia) members.34 Though this 
organization has criminal character and definitely is not included in the definitions of 
NPOs or NGOs, it is also active on the area of disaster relief and that was the case 
in Kobe. Professional NGOs that made efforts to support people in the devastated area 
of Kobe was Japan Overseas Christian Medical Cooperative Service (JOCS).35 JOCS was 
established in 1960 and was rooted in The Japan Christian Medical Association (JCMA).36 
Another professional NGO that came to the area was Japan Red Cross.37 Local groups 
also took part in the effort and Peace Boat is one of those. They had been active abroad 
as well but as anti-establishment group and their actions for Asia reconciliation had been 
perceived as anti-Japanese.38 Educational cruise ship Peace Boat was one of entities that 
24 Sakaki, Lukner, 2013: 164 
25 Avenell 2012: 55. In older publications the data is somewhat different: Schwartz gives a number of 
approximately 1,3 million (Schwartz 2003: 14), and Pekkanen gives a number of 1.2 million (Pekkanen 2000: 114).
26 Imada 2010: 22.
27 Bochorodycz 2008: 32.
28 Arita 2013.
29 Ibidem.
30 Avenell 2012: 55.
31 Pekkanen 2000: 116. 
32 Leng, 2015.
33 Pekkanen 2000: 116.
34 Jones 2011.
35 Leng, 2015.
36 JOCS.
37 Leng, 2015. 
38 Avenell 2012: 57.
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started providing help for Kobe struck by the disaster. Having on board a lithographic 
printing machine, they published a free paper with the information that was needed by 
people in the area. The group was up-to-date with the state of affairs as they visited 
several evacuation places in Nagata Ward (Kobe) on daily basis and volunteered for 
three months in the region.39
Other local groups are Osaka Voluntary Action Centre (OVAC), Rescue Stockyard,40 
and other NPOs such as Japan Youth Volunteer Association (JYVA), YMCA and YWCA 
also contributed as well as religious groups like Tenrikyō, Sōtō Zen Buddhism and 
Shanti Volunteer Association (SVA).41 Worth mentioning is prompt response of Foreigner’s 
Earthquake Information Centre and Foreign Relief Network which both helped the 
foreigners caught up by the calamity who needed information or assistance while having 
difficulties in obtaining health care for overstaying their visas.42
Kobe earthquake sparked strong interest among common people, however, in 1995 
the volunteers were not public-interest legal persons. According to the Civil code “groups 
had to become legal persons in order to have legal standing.”43 Thus most of volunteers 
could not signs contracts, did not have any special insurance during performing relief 
works. Japanese participation in NPOs after Kobe earthquake of 1995 rose and in response 
to this finally the diet passed the new law in 1998. The “Law to Promote Specified 
Non-profit Activities” (NPO Law) changed the status of the non-profit organizations.44 
Consequently the times of operating of these groups until 1998 can be named ‘for-profit’, 
after that year – ‘non-profit’. The Articles 33, 34 and 35 of the Civil Code from 1896 
limited the definition of civil society groups to ‘for-profit’ organizations:45 
Article 33: 
 No juridical person can be formed unless it is formed pursuant to the 
applicable provisions of this Code or other laws.46
Article 34:
 Any association or foundation relating to any academic activities, 
art, charity, worship, religion, or other public interest which is not for 
profit may be established as a juridical person with the permission of the 
competent government agency.47
39 Arita 2013.
40 Leng, 2015.
41 Avenell 2012: 57.
42 Ibidem.
43 Pekkanen 2000: 113, 117.
44 Pekkanen 2000: p. 114.
45 Ibidem, pp. 116–117.
46 MOJ, 1896: 15.
47 Ibidem.
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Article 35:
 Any person who is neither an incorporated association nor an 
incorporated foundation shall not use in its name the words “incorporated 
association” or “incorporated foundation”, or other words which is likely 
to be mistaken for those words.48 
The NPO Law introduced less supervision of bureaucracy and definitively less 
bureaucratic screening what helped the people to act and react.49 Funds has been flowing 
into the organizations. The amount of money distributed in grants by private agencies 
and NGOs in Japan in the span of 15 years almost tripled.
Table 2. Statistics of grants by private agencies and NGOs 2000–201550
Year Grants total 
(in million US dollars)
Year Grants total 
(in million US dollars)
2000 202.605 2008 422.517
2001 235.465 2009 452.604
2002 164.799 2010 563.301
2003 330.453 2011 374.754
2004 395.891 2012 370.973
2005 245.592 2013 429.628
2006 324.327 2014 467.190
2007 468.769 2015 557.189
Source: OECD, Grants by private agencies and NGOs Total, https://data.oecd.org/drf/grants-by-private-
agencies-and-ngos.htm [2017.03.27].
The case of Fukushima 2011 and its aftermath
Japan is a country that is prone to natural disasters, such as typhoons, flash-rains, 
mud-slides and earthquakes along with tsunamis which often cause massive flooding 
and fires. Its history is studded with such catastrophic events that mark its vulnerability 
and its people. Unfortunately it is not a matter of “if”, but “when” these calamities 
happen and indisputably Japan must be prepared any time for them. Events from Kobe 
of 1995 proved that a lot had to be done to improve the crisis-management in Japan, 
but the worst was still to happen. March 11th 2011 marks the day of a huge earthquake 
48 Ibidem.
49 Pekkanen 2000: 137–138.
50 OECD 2017.
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and tsunamis along with an unprecedented nuclear crisis in this country, named triple 
disaster. The location of the epicentre was near the East Coast of Honshu,51 thus the 
elevation of deadly “black waves” was surprisingly high. The number of deceased and 
missing people reached approximately 20,000.52 Due to destruction and contamination 
about 340,000 people had to be evacuated.53 Approximately 470,00 were displaced.54 
This time volunteers also rushed with help. The Prime Minister Naoto Kan the very next 
day appointed his representatives responsible for management of disaster volunteers.55 
The response to Tōhoku disaster from the government thus was superior comparing to 
1995 activities.56 
Quasi-governmental institutions: Zenshakyō and the Red Feather Community Chest 
Movement (RFCC) played a great role in coordination, liaison service and funding. The 
former one has been active in establishing volunteer centres throughout Japan since 1980s 
and coordinated registration.57 Peace Boat again took part in relief efforts. The organization 
established Peace Boat Disaster Relief Volunteer Center, an NGO in Tokyo, in order to 
provide organized help in long term.58 Since that time they managed to coordinate as many 
as over 13,000 volunteers from around the world and organized projects that provided 
psychological support for residents of temporary housings, finding jobs opportunities 
for unemployed fishermen in the area and others that raise awareness of the tragedy of 
Fukushima citizens.59 The organisation operated in Ishinomaki and cooperated closely 
with Ishinomaki’s Mayor, Social Welfare Council, Japan Youth Chamber and Japan Self-
Defence Forces (SDF).60 
Though it is highly questionable whether it is even possible to maintain readiness 
to react promptly and in a due manner when a top 4 magnitude (M 9,0) quake of the 
world’s earthquakes since year 1900 hits just like during Tohoku-oki of March 11th,61 
Tokyo could have done much more. Notwithstanding Japan’s learning the lesson from 
Kobe earthquake, it was not enough. First and the most important issue was the flow of 
information on the situation in Fukushima reactors. The information dissemination was 
poor and the government of Prime Minister Naoto Kan was condemned for “amateurish 
crisis communication”62 amongst the main actors of the crisis as well as amid the citizens.63 
The state owned Japanese television NHK World broadcasted on the Internet the picture 
51 USGS.
52 Sugimoto 2014: 318.
53 Ibidem.
54 PVB.
55 Avenell 2012: 62.
56 Leng 2015.
57 Avenell 2012: 63–65.
58 PVB.
59 Ibidem.
60 Leng 2015.
61 USGS.
62 Sakaki, Lukner 2013: 163.
63 Ibidem.
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from the Fukushima area and it was clearly visible that there must have been an explosion 
along with highly probable leak of contaminated steam. Unfortunately, whilst French 
authorities after the second explosion expressed their misgivings about the radioactivity and 
issued a statement to leave the region of Kanto,64 at the same time Tokyo advised to keep 
away from the Fukushima plant in the radius of only 20 kilometres.65 For the French the 
distance between the metropolis and Fukushima of approximately 250 kilometres was not 
safe enough.66 For lack in flow of information, the chief cabinet blamed TEPCO (Tokyo 
Electric Power Corporation, the Fukushima plant operator) and the Nuclear Industrial 
Safety Agency (NISA).67 After the Prime Minister Kan had decided to sent his close 
advisor to the TEPCO’s headquarters, Kan’s press conferences on the issue did not calm 
the public down and even made the people feel more unrest and willing to speculate 
especially when MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology) 
in April changed the yearly limit for radiation exposure for children in Fukushima from 
1 to 20 millisieverts it caused people to express their outrage with such new limitation.68 
People demonstrated and even put up a tent city on the premises of the government to 
put pressure on the politicians. 
TEPCO and the Japanese government did not inform from the beginning on the 
situation in the nuclear plant openly assumedly due to problems with communications 
(problems with power in the region). It would be also logical to suppose that TEPCO did 
not know for sure what happened down there in Fukushima reactors and that Tokyo did not 
want to spark immense panic. Undeniable about the government policy is only the thing 
of not confirming the meltdown up to May 2011 (as long as two months after the disaster) 
and finally only a week before International Atomic Energy Agency arrived in Japan 
to investigate, the government and TEPCO at last had admitted the state of an issue.69
The Fukushima accident was a kind of a test for the Japanese civil society. 
Unfortunately, it proved weakness of civil society in Japan as organizations were not 
able to control the government nor the industry though volunteers were managed better.70 
After year 2011 when nuclear deterrent gained even more supporters than earlier it had 
had and they expressed their indignation on the streets about the government policy and 
mistakes done during the Fukushima crisis. They even gathered in much bigger numbers 
in 2012 when Kansai Electric Power Co. restarted two reactors. After 3/11 all the nuclear 
facilities were cold shut down for maintenance.71
64 Robinson 2011. 
65 Ibidem.
66 Google 2017. In straight line the distance is about 250 kilometres (IAEA 2015, p. 80).
67 Sakaki, Lukner 2013: 163.
68 Ibidem.
69 Adelstein 2013. 
70 Hasegawa 2014: 286.
71 Batty 2012.
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The issue of the use of energy produced from atom in Japan is complex due to 
historical background and the lack in gas, coal or crude oil that would give this country’s 
economy energy. The trauma that was created by atomic bombs explosions is visible 
even today in Japan. A question arises, how so sceptical about the atom nation accepted 
nuclear plants on its territory. In May 1958 year the uranium deposits were discovered 
in Japan, and less than a year later enrichment of it started. The first reactor was started in 
1967 year. Before the 11th March 2011 there were 18 nuclear plants in which 54 reactors 
were working and taking into consideration Japan’s past this is really a surprising state 
of affairs.72 Society after Fukushima has been objecting to restarting of nuclear plants. 
Polls show that the steady majority society is for withdrawal of nuclear power from 
Japan since 2011.73
In Japan there will always be an ongoing crash of views of inevitability of natural 
disasters versus ‘nuclear village’ that supports usage of nuclear energy. By Sugimoto 
‘nuclear village’ means nuclear power promoters, that is nuclear power industry, national 
bureaucracy and political circles. Some individuals from the academe world also contribute 
to the “village” spreading the myth of safe nuclear energy.74 Hasegawa adds the mass 
media to the aforementioned description.75 All these actors are connected closely and 
support each other in insuring the society about this “clean” energy. Sugimoto points 
out the structural complicity as the main reason for malfunctioning in TEPCO. The 
controlling entity, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, a part of the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry that promotes usage of nuclear energy, was to supervise 
the safety. The next problem in the Japanese bureaucracy is the amakudari practice. 
Literarily it means ‘landing from heaven’ and in reality it is landing by a retired official 
onto a highly lucrative position in a private company, very often the one that he had 
supervised while being employed as a bureaucrat.76 Along with cases of specialists from 
universities who are not promoted when expressing doubts about safety of the nuclear 
energy and an old-fashioned management style from 1980s of TEPCO, internal cohesion, 
loyalty of its employees, decision-making done behind-closed-doors, no transparency 
(a record of concocted data on radioactivity leak in the past), and complicated flow 
of information within that company – all of them give a full scale of drawbacks of the 
system in Japan.77 
Unfortunately, due to these close relations and dependence there was no proper 
supervision before 2011 year in nuclear plants in Japan. Fukushima accident was caused 
by the nature nevertheless could have been prevented if the civil society had been much 
stronger. 
72 JAEA.
73 T.B. 2014.
74 Sugimoto 2014: 318–319. 
75 Hasegawa 2014: 286.
76 Stockwin 2003: XXIII, 9 
77 Ibidem, pp. 319–320.
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Civil society, denuclearization and the elections in 2012 and 2016
The Japanese has always expressed their concerns over building of nuclear plants 
and uranium enrichment. Until Fukushima accident the time when they demonstrated 
can be divided into four periods with different aims. Until 1973 – the Yom Kippur War, 
demonstrators mostly wanted abolishing nuclear weapons, but with the oil crisis and peak 
in building new nuclear plants they wished for abolishing construction of nuclear power 
plants and expressed their views mainly on the building sites. In the year of Chernobyl 
disaster Japanese housewives in cities took the same aim and finally demonstrations from 
1992 to 2011 mainly touched upon anti-plutonium movement.78 
Table 3. Anti-nuclear protests periods in Japan 
Period of time Aim
1954–1973 Abolishing nuclear weapons
1973–1986 Abolishing construction of nuclear power plants (at the spot)
1986–1992 Abolishing construction of nuclear power plants (organized mainly 
by housewives in cities) 
1992–2011 Anti-plutonium movement
Source: Hasegawa 2011: 288.
Five years after the Fukushima calamity less and less people come to the every Friday 
gathering at the Primes Minister’s office to protest. They started in March 2012 and that 
time even 200,000 protesters managed to come. In February 2016 they drew attention of 
only approximately 1,000 people each Friday. The protesting people express their doubts 
if anything can be changed as the government is not listening to their voices expressing 
will for denuclearization.79 The movement seems to be slowing down not only due to 
politicians, but also the very structure of the movement. The advantage of the movement 
is that it represents people of all ages and many professions (not salary men who work 
long hours and do not have time to protest).80 On the other hand, it is divided into groups 
and when it comes to elderly people involved in the activity they have problems with 
new communications styles like portals and social networks which have been mainly 
used by the new wave of protestors since 2011. Local groups do not feel at ease with 
letting outsiders into their groups as the already existing groups are parochial so there 
is no fresh blood coming.81 Even the flagship of the movement – Japan’s Anti-Nuke 
Occupy Tent protest that started 11th September 2011 with putting up tents in front of 
METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) was finally removed by force from 
78 Hasegawa 2014: 288.
79 Aoki 2016.
80 Sugimoto 2014: 324.
81 T.B. 2014.
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the site 21 August 2016 and as protestors did not have special permissions and they 
were also fined.82
Being aware of the situation and the reasons for it thanks to media reports, since 
2011 the Japanese should have tried to vote for only these political options that express 
popular view on nuclear plants and support denuclearization. Unfortunately, none of 
major parties put on the agenda denuclearization as the most important issue and thus 
the Japanese people who are against restarting reactors did not have anyone to vote for. 
Consequently in election in 2012 won opposition party to DPJ (Democratic Party of 
Japan) – LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) that supports using nuclear energy. The same 
results of elections were in 2016.
Table 4. List of Prime Ministers of Japan and their policy on nuclearization83 
Party Prime Minister Stance on the energy Terms 
DPJ Naoto Kan Till 11/3 nuclearization
After 11/3 de-nuclearization
Jun. 2010 – Sep. 2011
DPJ Yoshihiko Noda nuclearization Sep. 2011 – Dec. 2012
LDP Shinzō Abe safe nuclearization
promoting other sources 
Dec. 2012 – on
Abbreviations: DPJ – Democratic Party of Japan; LDP – Liberal Democratic Party.
Sources: Shinoda, 2011; KANTEI; KANTEI 2016: 79.
Nuclearization means restarting the nuclear plants and putting aside people’s opinions 
even though they are against this move. Regrettably, Prime Minister Shinzō Abe introduces 
a law that can be used against the civil society and anti-nuclear activists. The development 
of anti-nuclear energy activism from 2011 among Japanese citizens was a phenomenon 
that found the government unprepared to deal with. On December 10th 2014 a special 
law came into effect despite the fact that about 80 per cent of the public had opposed it 
in the previous year. Prime Minister Abe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defence 
Ministry, the Japan Business Federation (Nippon Keidanren), and the police were the main 
supporters of establishing the rule that would “prevent domestic terrorism,” or “designated 
harmful activities.”84 At activists fear this new law might be used against them and thus 
hurt the civil society development despite the fact that it was established to prevent such 
cases like leaking of secret information.85 
82 AS 2016. 
83 Shinoda, 2011; KANTEI; KANTEI 2016: 79. 
84 Johnston 2014. 
85 Ibidem.
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Conclusions
Japanese civil society has been a developing phenomenon which gained in its speed 
after WWII. The history of Japanese protests, and particularly these against the use of 
nuclear energy in their land, development of NPOs show that the Japanese have an 
account of expressing their thoughts on the streets. Unfortunately, despite of having much 
more propitious law, they are not able to find good representatives in the parliament to 
present their opinions on denuclearization. The article proves that civil society groups are 
rather ineffective in denuclearization field in Japan as the pragmatism of the government 
is prevailing. Moreover, the civil society when dealing with denuclearization issue is not 
well unified and also regionalism and age differences can pose a potential threat to the 
movement which is losing its momentum.
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